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O’Keefe v. State of Nev. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, Nev. Adv. Op. 92 (Dec. 6, 2018) (en banc)1 
 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: HEARING OFFICER DECISIONS 
 
Summary 
 
 The Court reviewed de novo whether a classified employee violated a law or regulation 
when she challenged a challenges a state agency’s decision to terminate.  Moreover, the Court 
applied a deferential standard of reasonableness to the agency’s decision to terminate the employee 
in service of the public good. 
 
Background 
 
 Appellant Cara O’Keefe was a long-time employee at the Nevada Department of Motor 
Vehicles. After she transferred to a position at the Nevada Department of Insurance, two of her 
colleagues reported that she made unauthorized calls to regarding DUIs to the sheriff’s office. 
O’Keefe returned to the DMV but was terminated after an investigation revealed that she accessed 
confidential DMV databases for nonwork purposes in violation of Prohibition G(1) of the DMV’s 
Prohibitions and Penalties employee offense classifications. In a pre-disciplinary memorandum, 
the DMV administrator noted that Prohibition G(1) regarding the misuse of information 
technology is a terminable offense even after the first violation. The DMV director concluded that 
it was in the best interest of the State of Nevada to terminate O’Keefe. 
 O’Keefe requested a hearing to challenge her termination. The hearing officer found that 
she had violated Prohibition G(1). Nonetheless, the officer found that O’Keefe’s violation was not 
serious enough to merit termination before other disciplinary measures and the evidence did not 
establish that her termination would serve the public good. The hearing officer vacated the DMV’s 
decision and recommended a 30-day suspension. The DMV sought judicial review of the decision. 
 The district court set aside the hearing officer’s decision. The hearing officer found that 
O’Keefe had violated Prohibition G(1), which warranted termination even for a first offense. The 
court reasoned that this established just cause and made her termination reasonable as a matter of 
law. O’Keefe appealed. The court of appeals affirmed that the hearing officer’s ruling was arbitrary 
and erroneous. This appeal followed.  
 
Discussion  
 
The hearing officer acted arbitrarily and capriciously in holding that O’Keefe’s conduct did not 
constitute a serious violation of law or regulation 
 
 The standard of review for a hearing officer’s decision is whether the evidence shows that 
the hearing officer acted arbitrarily or capriciously, therefore abusing their discretion.2 Classified 
state employees are protected by state laws and regulations which require agencies to impose 
progressive discipline measures rather than termination against employees except where the 
conduct constitutes a “serious violation[] of law or regulation[],”3 It is undisputed that O’Keefe is 
                                                     
1  By Jacqueline Cope. 
2  Knapp v. State Dep’t of Prisons, 111 Nev. 420, 424, 892 P.2d 575, 578 (1995). 
3  NEV. REV. STAT. 284.383(1) (2017). 
a classified employee who violated Prohibition G(1), which amounts to a serious offense for the 
purpose of NRS 284.383(1) and warrants termination for a first time violation. Here, the hearing 
officer found that she violated the prohibition but nonetheless vacated the agency’s decision. 
Accordingly, the hearing officer acted arbitrarily and capriciously by disregarding the DMV’s 
regulations and vacating the agency’s decision to terminate O’Keefe. 
 
The hearing officer applied an erroneous legal standard when it determined that O’Keefe’s 
termination was not for the good of the public service 
 
 The next question is whether the hearing officer applies de novo or deferential review to 
the agency’s determination that the termination served the good of the public service as required 
by NRS 284.385(1)(a).4 O’Keefe argues that de novo review is appropriate and that the hearing 
officer correctly applied the standard. However, the relevant regulation and statute that O’Keefe 
points to in support of de novo review authorizes a hearing officer to review de novo whether the 
employee committed the charged violation warranting termination, not the reasonableness or 
sufficient cause for the termination. De novo review is also not appropriate because the agency is 
in a better position to assess what serves the good of the public service. Thus, hearing officers must 
apply a deferential standard when determining that the agency deemed the employee’s termination 
as serving the good of the public service required by statute. 
 Confusion about the appropriate standard of review is based on decisions in three cases 
considering disciplinary actions by the Nevada Department of Prisons (“NDOP”).5 The earliest 
case, Dredge,6 established that deference to an agency’s decision to terminate as serving the good 
of the public service was even more critical “whenever safety concerns are implicated in the 
employee’s termination.”7 This only implies deference in situations where security is a concern, 
not a bright line rule that a hearing officer does not generally owe any deference unless security 
concerns are implicated. Further, the cases do not differentiate the standards of review as to 1) 
whether the employee committed the offense and 2) whether the agency’s decision was reasonable 
and made with just cause. The Court therefore overruled the parts of Knapp and Jackson that 
indicate a hearing officer reviews de novo that an employee’s termination serves the good of the 
public service.  
 When a classified employee challenges their termination after a first-time violation, the 
hearing officer must apply a three-step reasonableness test to review the agency’s decision. First, 
the hearing officer reviews de novo whether the employee in fact committed the violation. Second, 
the officer determines whether the violation was a serious violation of law or regulation. If the 
agency has a published regulation indicating that termination is appropriate even for a first-time 
violation, that violation is serious as a matter of law. Finally, the hearing officer applies a 
deferential standard of review to the agency’s decision to terminate an employee in service of the 
public good.  
 Here, the hearing officer correctly applied de novo review to determine that O’Keefe 
violated DMV Prohibition G(1), but acted arbitrarily or capriciously by deciding that her violation 
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was not serious as a matter of law. The officer also arbitrarily and capriciously reviewed de novo 
the DMV’s conclusion that her termination served the good of the public service. There is 
substantial evidence that the decision was reasonable. First, the delay of the investigation into her 
conduct was due to her transferring departments. Second, even though she committed no prior 
offenses, she still violated an offense warranting termination for a first-time violation. Finally, the 
evidence shows that O’Keefe was on notice that the violation could result in termination and that 
four other employees were terminated for ignoring the provision. The evidence thus shows that 
the DMV acted reasonably by determining that O’Keefe’s termination served the good of the 
public service.   
 
Conclusion 
 
 The Court found that the district court was correct in holding that the hearing officer 
applied the wrong standard of review to the DMV’s decision to terminate O’Keefe. Hearing 
officers review de novo whether the employee committed the offense. However, they must apply 
a deferent standard of review to the agency’s determination that the termination served the good 
of the public service. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court’s order granting review 
and setting aside the hearing officer’s decision. 
 
PICKERING, J. concurring: 
 
 The hearing officer was incorrect as a matter of law in concluding that O’Keefe’s violation 
required progressive discipline rather than termination. The DMV’s Prohibition G(1) is a policy 
approved by the statutorily created Personnel Commission to avoid progressive discipline and 
terminate any employee who misuses DMV data. O’Keefe argued that the DMV did not uniformly 
enforce this provision prior to 2011, but the record shows the agency had since terminated four 
others for the same violation, thus she was not treated dissimilarly from other employees. 
 That should be the end of the analysis because the appeal does not implicate the issues in 
Knapp, where all of the parties agreed that termination was not warranted for the offense.8 The 
majority misses the key point, which is that the Court owes deference to hearing officers, not 
agencies, in deciding mixed questions of law and fact. O’Keefe presented substantial evidence that 
the DMV selectively enforced Prohibition G(1), which presented a mixed question of law and fact 
to which the reviewing court must defer to the hearing officer under NRS 233B.135(3).9  
 The majority’s decision decides on an issue not presented at appeal, departing from 
statutory mandate and unnecessarily overruling existing precedent, which adds confusion to this 
area of the law. This case should be resolved the way the district court did, by holding that the 
hearing officer committed error by second-guessing the DMV as to the seriousness of O’Keefe’s 
unauthorized DMV queries. Justice Pickering concurred in the decision to reverse the hearing 
officer only because of the hearing officer’s legal error in concluding O’Keefe’s violation was not 
sufficiently serious to justify termination. However, she did not ascribe to the new three-step 
process and would not ignore prior cases that outline a hearing officer’s duty to provide 
independent, fair, and impartial review of disciplinary actions against state employees. 
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